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How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2020:
A Warning from the Future
By Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
Editors Note: Security is much more than not losing, but it is predicated on not losing. Our focus
with the writing competition can reasonably be seen as addressing a subset of a broader concept of
security. This entry didn't answer directly address that subset question, but it surely framed the
challenge and presumptions in which the question exists. We were happy to receive it and to publish it here. Our thanks to the author, Major General Charlie Dunlap, and to other like-minded
thinkers and contributors to Small Wars Journal such as Colonel Gian Gentile, for challenging
group think and forcing intellectual rigor.
The following is a transcript of a secret address
delivered by the Great Leader to the Supreme War
Council late in the year 2020.
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND THE
PARTY, I welcome my comrades to this celebration
of our great victory over our most arrogant enemy,
America. A little over ten years ago they crowed
about how their entire armed forces were ―adapting‖ to wage what was then known as ―irregular
warfare‖. They were guilty, as so many before
them were, of preparing to fight the last war instead of the next. We observed their error and exploited it into the victory we honor today.
The core of their miscalculation was the belief that conventional war against powerful nation
states - what they called ―peer competitors‖ - was
passé.
With great fanfare, the Americans issued a
new manual for counterinsurgency, and many of
their national security elites embraced it as if it
were a panacea for all possible conflicts. To our
delight, they restructured their entire military to
conduct such low-tech operations. We had no intent to fight that kind of war, and did not do so
when the time came.
Popular American thinking at that time expressed a grand vision that irregular wars, like the
insurgencies they fought in Iraq and Afghanistan,
would be the primary challenge for U.S. forces for
the future.
Of course, no one disputed that such conflicts would persist in the 21st century. Still, why
American policymakers thought that there was an
appetite among their electorate to put massive
numbers of U.S. troops on the ground in another
―Iraq‖ or ―Afghanistan-like‖ situation is a mystery
to us, but that is what they instructed their planners to concentrate upon.
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They ignored such evidence as the fact that
significant majorities of their people still concluded
it was a mistake to have waged war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, despite such military success as they
enjoyed. The American people – and their politicians - were rightly wary of another such operation.
Their own experts calculated the material cost well
into the trillions of dollars and the human cost
played out on their television screens nightly.
When some of their generals tried to warn
that their military needed to be prepared to confront adversaries like ourselves, their own Secretary of Defense mocked them as suffering from
―Next-War-it is.‖
We cheered when it was mandated that in
order to ―remain viable‖ any major arms program
―will have to show some utility and relevance‖ to
irregular operations. The implementation of this
meant that the weapons we feared the most were
never built in the numbers that might have deterred us. It seems that their strategists never fully
distinguished between the serious concerns irregular conflicts raised and the truly existential threats
presented by ‗regular‘ war.
We also celebrated when their Department
of Defense announced that ―nation building‖ and
―stability‘ operations were being put on equal footing with warfighting. Such a diffusion of focus
eroded the fighting ability of their once mighty military machine. No longer was it exclusively centered upon what their Supreme Court once said
was their purpose, that is, to ―fight wars or prepare
to fight them should the occasion arise.‖
This obsession with using the military for
nation building and stability operations was
strange to us. Americans apparently never really
understood it was a mistake to make their military,
the most authoritarian, undemocratic, and socialis-
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tic element of their society, the ―face‖ of their country to peoples struggling in failed or failing states.
Yes, the U.S. military did succeed in stabilizing some of these countries, but they imprinted the
people with the belief that only the armed forces
could get things done in a society.
In truth, the power of American society was
a product of its civilian institutions, not its military. It was the free enterprise system, not a military structure, which produced the freedom and
economic vitality that the U.S. enjoyed, and that
gave its military its supremacy. Yet with the bulk
of the U.S. military devoting itself to nationbuilding, the nations they ―built‖ around the world
established themselves with uniformed people, not
civilians, as the movers and shakers in their society
– exactly like their American military mentors.
It is no surprise that capable and secure civilian-led governments never permanently emerged
from these efforts. Of course, we were glad to deal
with military strongmen in these newly ―built‖ governments. They pragmatically accepted – no, welcomed - our political ideology that recognized that
Party leaders knew what was better for the People
than did the people themselves as true democracies
preached.
In devising their defense architecture in the
post-Iraq/Afghanistan era, the Americans also
never really understood that although insurgencies
could inflict great harm to their interests, they
could never present a genuine threat to the existence of the United States as superpower. Only a
nation such as ourselves, capable of fielding not
just one or a few nuclear weapons as an insurgency
or terrorist organization might, but hundreds and
even thousands of them, could truly threaten
America‘s very survival.
Some Americans believed that conflict with
us was implausible because of the economic links
between our countries. To them, war was ―illogical‖ and, therefore, wholly improbable. Apparently, they were unfamiliar with the British economist
Norman Angell who, a few years before the outbreak of the First World War, wrote a popular book
that promoted just such a theory. Of course, he
was profoundly wrong, as were the Americans of
2010 who thought similarly.
Actually, the logic of economics is more a
cause of war than a promoter of peace. Our case is
illustrative. In the early part of the 21st century,
we enjoyed tremendous economic progress because we were able to exploit the wage advantage
we obtained by turning the proletariat into ex-

smallwarsjournal.com

VOL. 6, NO. 2- FEB 19, 2010
tremely low-cost factory workers. Because we offered cheap labor, manufacturing of every type
flowed into our country. This produced a meteoric
rise in exports, and our nation was awash in profits. Our international prestige sky-rocketed.
The march of technology, however, did not
favor us. The marriage of nanotechnology and robotics produced automated manufacturing systems
of increasing sophistication. As more and more
such machines were developed, their cost – like so
many other computer-based products – continued
to drop. In an amazingly short period, machines
could economically replace the low-wage workers
that had favored us so much for several decades.
We watched with alarm as the productivity
of these advanced robots rose. In time, they became even cheaper than the cheapest of our laborers. Increasingly, it was cost-effective for the developed countries to have their own factories close
to the point of sale. Such local factories also did
not suffer the transportations expenses our products incurred. In short, the new fully-automated
local factories of the developed nations soon held
an almost insuperable advantage.
That left controlling the cost of energy and
raw materials as the only other factors in the manufacturing process that we could hope to control to
maintain our dominance. This, as you know, led to
conflict with the Americans.
You recall how: with respect to energy, we
increasingly were forced to rely upon cheaper but
environmentally unsound sources such as coal and
other fossil fuels. The world took notice, mainly
because advanced analytical techniques permitted
scientists to trace pollutants back to our country.
As various international organizations criticized us and even imposed various sanctions, our
message to our people was unwavering and resonated with our history. We told them that outsiders were once again trying to subjugate us, and this
began the drumbeat of nationalism that we would
use so effectively later.
Likewise, we sought to control key sources of
raw materials around the globe. When tough
commercial negotiations failed we bribed – and,
when necessary, threatened - the leaders of many
of the nations into granting us concessions at a
huge discount. By the time their own people realized what was happening, we had our own forces
in place to ―protect‖ our citizens and our ―property.‖ When the international community tried to
stop us, we fought them.
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The Americans, especially those who naively
believed that we shared their values, were slow to
realize how we intended to deal with the crisis.
They thought that we were a peaceful people more
interested in commerce than conflict.
Clearly, the Americans proved their naiveté.
Why? They tend to ―mirror image‖ peoples who, in
reality, do not reflect their culture or ideals. Americans too often are inclined to believe that all
peoples think as they do. In our case, they did not
appreciate how pervasive and deep-seated the resentment of past foreign domination was among
our peoples.
That resentment easily translated into warsupporting nationalism. Our Party used our country‘s always latent nationalism as a powerful tool
for energizing the People. It was not difficult for
our Information Ministry to paint a picture that
once again foreigners were seeking to reduce our
nation to subservience. Support for the use of
force was wide and deep not just among Party
members, but the proletariat generally.
We would not have dreamed of using force if
the Americans still had their capabilities they once
possessed to dominate high-technology war. Interestingly, too many Americans miscalculated how
quickly once-backward societies like ours could
integrate new technology into war-making systems
that could defeat the U.S. even without resorting to
nuclear weapons.
Our steady increase in defense spending on
high-technology paid off – especially as the Americans underfunded or even terminated the programs we most feared. Without a doubt, the U.S.
underestimated the investment and effort that
would be required to maintain the military superiority they enjoyed at the beginning of the 21st
century.
For example, a capability that really concerned us was American airpower. In particular, it
was the U.S.‘s ability to project that airpower anywhere in the world at almost any time. However,
the ability to do so depended upon aerial tankers
that re-fuel its warplanes during long flights.
America‘s air force was repeatedly frustrated by
political and legal difficulties from renewing and
expanding its tanker fleet. In our system, of
course, we have no such problems where national
security is concerned.
In the end, the U.S. had too few warplanes to
contain us. We mastered getting inside their "acquisition loop" and deployed newer systems before
they finished buying already obsolescent ones.
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Because we could manufacture the most advanced
electronic components in our country, the American military no longer possessed a monopoly on
the most sophisticated weaponry available.
WORSE YET FOR THE AMERICANS, besides believing that ―irregular warfare‖ reduced the
need for high-technology air, space, and naval
combat capabilities, they dramatically reduced
such forces in favor of increasing the numbers of
trendy "counterinsurgency" units.
These were filled not with warriors specially
trained for high-intensity combat but rather with a
curious kind of ―soldier‖ described in their counterinsurgency manual as one who ―must be prepared
to become…a social worker, a civil engineer, a
school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.‖ As you know,
we slaughtered these ―boy scouts‖ by the thousands!
Americans prided themselves in the fact that
they transformed their military into a multitude of
―culturally-sensitive‖ social workers who knew
much about our history and customs. What they
knew too little about was how to fight an aggressive, high-technology power who knew much about
the ways of war. Our troops were amused when
captured American troops begged for their lives in
our own language. Of course, it did them no good.
In any event, we found we could contend
with the light, low-tech counterinsurgency units
that comprised most of America's battle forces.
Early in the 21st century the U.S. added over
92,000 ground troops. We cheered! We wanted
the Americans to be spending $40 billion a year on
troops instead of technology. We never feared
America‘s ground forces because we were a nation
that could easily put millions into the field to oppose them. And we did so when the time came.
What we did fear was America‘s hightechnology forces because they had the potential to
block our ability to project power. That is why we
were thrilled when it became chic in the U.S. to
denigrate the role of technology in war. If anyone
spoke approvingly of a high-tech weapon, they
were immediately condemned as an out-of-fashion
―Cold War‖ thinker.
Strangely, even though it was widely known
that we were building a high-tech, globally-capable
force, the Americans seemed to ignore that in their
planning. While we were building fifth-generation
fighters, they were turning their fearsome military
into a ‗soft power‘ collection of do-gooders skilled
mainly at winning hearts and minds. Our missiles
and bombs had no hearts and minds to win, and
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the Americans paid with their lives accordingly.
Our strategy was based on force, theirs on hope.
WE CONSTANTLY LOOKED for imaginative ways to undermine the U.S.‘s defense establishment as it had evolved in the 21st century. For
example, America had become increasingly dependant upon its reserves and National Guard not as a
strategic reserve as originally intended by their
Founding Fathers, but as a force they depended
upon to meet current operational requirements.
This policy hurt them in a number of ways.
It became the fashion in U.S. defense circles
to say that part-time troops were the equivalent of
regulars every way. They made any departure from
those assertions appear to be questioning the patriotism and dedication of the part-timers. No one
wanted to accept that modern war is so psychologically daunting and technically complex that it is
best waged by full-time professionals. These truths
were simply candid and frank analysis of military
requirements, not assessments of people‘s character, but they were politically unspeakable in America.
So America continued to pour costly incentives into maintaining their part-timers, and even
created ―missions‖ so as to justify their numbers.
It became so attractive to serve as a part-timer that
many full-time professionals opted into that status.
Why make all the sacrifices to be a regular when
virtually the same benefits were available to parttimers who could choose where they wanted to live
and, often, how frequently they wanted to serve?
The denigration of the full-time professional in
favor of the part-timer proved disastrous.
What is more is that this policy underestimated the importance of homeland security in the
minds of America‘s state governors. The threat of
terrorism, as well as the increasing expectations of
the electorate when natural disasters struck,
caused governors to insist that these troops not be
deployed overseas at times of crisis. Consequently,
as I will discuss in a moment, we did our best to
create as many terrorist incidents as possible.
When the Guard became politically ‗undeployable‘,
it hobbled the U.S. military in the ability to confront us.
The Americans had also come to depend
upon a whole range of contractors to run their war
machine. Many American policymakers seemed to
think that anything done by private companies was
inherently cheaper and more efficient than government. It is true that the competition of free enterprise will, in most cases, produce such results.
However, warfighting is the exception that proves
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the rule. Specifically, the mercenary values of the
marketplace do not sustain people in the crucible
of war.
People in business make decisions based on
cost-benefit analysis. We recognized that no
amount of money makes it ‗worth it‘ to any company or, more importantly, any individual to die. Of
course, we aimed our most sophisticated and vicious attacks on these contractors, and we enjoyed
much success. What is more, is that when we captured contractors, we designated them as unlawful
combatants and tried them for their crimes against
our People and The Party. It did not take many
executions before the contractors were walking
away from their contracts, crippling the American
military at the worst possible time.
We used the indirect approach again by attacking other vulnerable targets both inside and
outside the United States. For example, our agents
acquire interests in companies around the world.
When the time came, they refused to trade with the
U.S. More importantly, we controlled many financial institutions though our huge investment holdings. We were amazed at how naïve the Americans
were to overlook our activities for the decade preceding the war.
YOU KNOW THE REST, comrades. Our
high-tech forces often defeated the Americans on
the battlefield, and we were able to inflict such punishment on their homeland that they were soon
pleading for peace at any price. With their military
shattered, their economy reeling, and their people
demoralized, their defeat was complete. Their will
was broken!
As strong as our determination was, we
would not have triumphed if America had not deceived herself about the nature of future war. She
bled herself dry waging an endless series of ‗irregular wars‘ while her ability to fight ‗regular wars‘
atrophied. She deluded herself about her conventional superiority, and failed to realize the overarching importance of readiness to meet existential
threats.
Had America paid attention to the growing
capabilities of militaries such as ours, she no doubt
could have maintained such dominance that nations like ours might not have dared to oppose her
– we keenly understand brute force and its consequences.
Now the Americans beg for scraps. So desperate are they that they send their children here to
be our servants. We control their future! That is
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the cost of defeat! Let us praise the Party and the
People!
***
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. is an active duty Air Force
major general, and is the author of the essay, How
We Lost the High Tech War of 2007, published in

the January 29, 1996 issue of the WEEKLY STANDARD from which this essay gets its inspiration.
Additional biographical data, and official photo
are all publicly available at
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bio
ID=5293.

Book Excerpt: Senator’s Son: An Iraq War Novel
by Luke S. Larson
Chapter 24
Senator‘s Son: An Iraq War Novel will be available from your favorite booksellers, including Amazon, on
February 25, 2010. Published by K.E. Inc., Scottsdale, AZ. © 2008, Luke S. Larson. Reprinted here by
permission. See also: Luke‘s site, Zenpundt review, and Chapter 1 via Google books.
A white van with ―Wounded Warrior‖
printed on the side pulled up in front of the apartment building. A reserve gunnery sergeant drove
the van; he wore his uniform. John climbed in the
van with his walker. He looked at the six other Marines, all of whom were junior enlisted. The oldest
Marine barely looked twenty-one. The sight of
them warmed his heart. God damn, I love Marines!
―Hey, how‘s it going, sir,‖ said a Marine who
recognized the lieutenant from Bethesda.
―Good, good; just call me John today.‖
He wore jeans and a polo shirt. All of the
other wounded Marines were dressed in jeans and
sweaters, no uniforms.
―How are you doing?‖ asked John to the
wounded veteran sitting next to him.
―I‘m doing good,‖ said the lance corporal
who lost his leg in an IED blast in Fallujah. ―They
told me I was the fastest Marine they‘ve seen move
from walking therapy to running therapy. Also I
got three of these bad boys.‖

was excited. He was going to get to throw the opening pitch of the game. Private Paul looked normal
in jeans but walked slightly hunched over with a
slight limp. In the van, on the way to the game, the
Marines showed their scars and swapped stories.
Paul‘s story involved being ripped open by a mortar round in Al Qaim. His stomach was a horrific
site. John smiled at the private. This ought to be
good. These men deserve to get a little celebration
after all they’ve been through.
As they walked to their seats, Paul was escorted down to the side of the field. John looked
out onto the green field as a military color guard
presented the flag during the national anthem. He
left his walker in the aisle and struggled to stand on
his own.
As they started to the national anthem, John
couldn‘t help notice the man in front of him did not
remove his hat. The man looked thirty-something.
He wore a Ralph Lauren windbreaker and khakis.
He stood slouched seemingly disinterested as the
national anthem played. His hat absorbed John‘s
attention.
―Excuse me,‖ said the Marine in a sharp

The nineteen-year-old pulled up his left pant
leg and tapped on his prosthetic. A Marine Corps
sticker covered the manufacturer‘s name.

tone.

―One for running, one for hiking, and one for
everything else.‖

―Can you take your hat off please?‖ asked
John. ―I find it disrespectful.‖

The van pulled up and the motley crew
limped their way inside the stadium. The youngestlooking Marine of the bunch was named Paul. He

―Well I don‘t really give a damn what you
think is disrespectful, this is a free country.‖
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―Yes,‖ said the man turning his head back to
look at the lieutenant.
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